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Abstract
Legal hermeneutics carries the hallmark of a genuine scientific paradigm. It is the locus 
of professional commitment, that is, a generally accepted view about the nature of legal 
adjudication. But as any genuine paradigm, legal hermeneutics also eludes the production of its 
full interpretation or rationalisation. Although most lawyers and legal scholars feel compelled 
to employ some standard set of methods, this consensus does not imply an underlying body of 
rules and assumptions that fully accounts for legal praxis and legal research. The paradigm of 
legal hermeneutics, flourishing on the level of legal praxis, is itself a subject of different schools 
of thought. This article explores different theories of law, sparked off by philosophical and legal 
hermeneutics. It argues that some of the weaknesses of hermeneutics are remedied by speech act 
theory. It discusses the increasing scientific interest in the role of metaphor in human thought 
and emphasises the import of the study of legal metaphor, which is inseparable from culture and 
tradition, for the study of law.
Keywords: hermeneutics, relativism, speech act theory, metaphor, culture and tradition, legal 
methodology.
If … the observer … does not give up any account of the manner in which members of the group 
who accept the rules view their own regular behaviour, his description of their life cannot be in 
terms of rules at all, and so not in the terms of the rule-dependent notions of obligation or duty.
(H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1994) at 89)
1 
It seems that the least controversial statement one can make on the topic of legal 
adjudication is that it is a rule-governed activity. This modest claim rests upon at least 
two characteristics of legal adjudication. First, the paradigm of legal adjudication is 
the application of rules, whether or not these rules can be found in statutes or have to 
be extracted from precedents.1 Secondly, legal adjudication itself, the set of processes 
of interpretation and application, is guided by rules. After all, a large portion of the 
training as a legal professional is devoted to the acquisition of interpretative techniques 
and modes of reasoning, such as linguistic and systematic interpretation, analogical 
reasoning and reasoning from precedent. It is the mastery of these techniques, rather 
than mere knowledge about the law, that offers the seal of genuine legal craftsmanship.2
 If legal adjudication is a rule-governed activity, both on the level of the law itself 
as well as on the level of the profession, legal adjudication, then, seems to be directed 
towards a text – rules, regulations, rulings and principles. Through these methodological 
standards, the text is recognised, interpreted and applied. This, at least, might explain 
the vast literature on the topic of legal adjudication. Different movements or schools, 
such as legalism, Freirechtsbewegung and Legal Realism, and their current counterparts 
like originalism, Critical Legal Studies, pragmatism and constructivism, vie with one 
another, challenging the assumptions and purposes of their rivals. Each school asserts 
to offer a more convincing account of the nature of legal adjudication and emphasises 
the practical import of the school to which the judge or official belongs. The stakes of 
* Senior Lecturer Legal Theory, Leiden University.
1 N. MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978) at 45.
2 M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia. The Structure of International Legal Argument (2005) esp. 
the Epilogue.
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the debates are high, for the conversion from one school to another is supposed to affect 
the outcome of the processes of legal reasoning significantly – though one wonders 
how often a learned judge switches the presuppositions and tacit knowledge of her 
profession under the pressure of critical theory.
 Among these schools, legal hermeneutics takes up a different position. It is not 
one school among the others, but it sits aside or, more precisely, on top of the row of 
competing schools that propagate one methodology as the proper one. The concern 
of legal hermeneutics is not how the judge ought to understand the law, but the act 
of understanding itself. It does not offer a particular methodology, neither does it 
prescribe which interpretive standards have priority in law, nor does it hold a hierarchy 
of legal values. Instead, it examines the conditions of understanding in general and of 
understanding the law in particular. The result is a phenomenology of understanding 
that includes legal schools of different colours, albeit not all colours.3 To the extent that 
legal hermeneutics offers an epistemology of the study of law that is accepted by most 
legal scholars, it might properly be said that hermeneutics serves as the paradigm for 
current European legal theory.4
 Although hermeneutics offers a philosophical account of the nature of understanding, 
rather than a particular methodology how to conduct legal research, it nevertheless 
structures the way legal research is actually conducted, from the selection of relevant 
legal issues to the evaluation and criticism of the legal theories, doctrines and legal 
solutions. In this respect, one might say, philosophy and theory matter for praxis.5 In 
this article, I would like to address the implications of the hermeneutic paradigm for 
the nature of legal research. As legal hermeneutics functions as a paradigm, that is, as a 
generally accepted view about the nature of legal science, from which spring particular 
coherent traditions of legal theory and research,6 I will focus on one topic that ties 
those traditions together: the alleged distinction between object and subject. This topic, 
intimately connected with the predicament of relativism, explains the emergence of 
different traditions or schools that share the hermeneutic paradigm. In this article, I 
will argue that speech act theory, inspired by the works of the later Wittgenstein, offers 
an elegant solution for the problem of relativism that hermeneutics raises, but has not 
convincingly settled. I will argue, furthermore, that both hermeneutics and speech act 
theory point towards the import of culture in the study of law.
2 
Before justifying the bold claim that the hermeneutic paradigm rules contemporary 
legal theory, I would like to dispel a potential misconception that stems from confusing 
the genesis of a conception with the theory that serves as its exemplary model. The 
thesis that most legal scholars endorse the hermeneutic paradigm merely expresses the 
3 Movements like original intent, strict constructionism and textualism, for example, reject the claim of 
hermeneutics that meaning is not something ‘given’, but the result of the interplay between text and reader. 
Instead, these movements hold that the meaning is already ‘there’, that is, in the (legal) text or mind of the 
drafters. For a defence of textualism, see A. Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation. Federal Courts and the Law 
(1997); for a defence of original intent, see Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation. Meaning, 
Original Intent, and Judicial Review (1999).
4 See J. Lenoble, ‘Narrative Coherence and the Limits of the Hermeneutical Paradigm’ in P. Nerhot (ed.), 
Law, Interpretation and Reality. Essays in Epistemology, Hermeneutics and Jurisprudence (1990) 127-168; 
B. Bix, ‘H.L.A. Hart and the Hermeneutic Turn’ (1999) 52 S.M.U. Law Review 167 at 181.
5 For the importance of theory, see M. Bal and I.E. Boer (eds.), The Point of Theory. Practices of Cultural 
Analysis (1994).
6 Cf. some of the descriptions of the concept of ‘paradigm’ by Kuhn: Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions (1962, rev. ed. 1970 (with postscript), 1996) esp. ch. II. Although this concept plays 
a key role in Kuhn’s work, he did not give a clear-cut definition of it. He calls it, among other things, an 
accepted example of actual scientific practice, a model from which spring particular coherent traditions of 
scientific research (p. 10), a single generally accepted view about the nature of something, a standard set 
of methods that every researcher felt forced to employ (p. 12), an accepted model or pattern (p. 20) and 
a disciplinary matrix (in the postscript to the 1970 edition, p. 182). Accordingly, I will use the concept of 
paradigm to connote both a shared viewpoint as well as a methodology, a conception, and a movement, etc.
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simple fact that current legal theory conceives of the processes of understanding the law 
in such way, that it could very well be described as hermeneutic. But the intellectual 
itinerary towards this position may never have crossed the path of philosophical (or 
legal) hermeneutics. The introduction of the participant’s perspective into descriptive 
legal theory by H.L.A. Hart, for example, has been seen as a kind of ‘hermeneutic turn’ 
in legal philosophy, although Hart’s legal philosophy is firmly embedded in analytical 
philosophy, rather than in phenomenology, of which philosophical hermeneutics 
derives its inspiration and borrows its vocabulary.7 And some authors, like the Dutch 
legal theorist Paul Scholten, have developed a legal methodology that has been rightly 
characterised as hermeneutical, albeit at a time that philosophical hermeneutics was still 
in the making.8 It is only with hindsight that we recognise the predecessor.
 In this article, legal hermeneutics is used to denote a specific conception of the act 
of understanding phenomena such as law, a conception that is shared by most legal 
scholars, although only some of them have arrived at this view through philosophical 
hermeneutics.
3 
What, then, is legal hermeneutics? And what makes it a paradigm for legal theory? To 
start with the first question: legal hermeneutics is a branch of philosophical hermeneutics. 
In order to understand legal hermeneutics, we have to turn to its source. For a full grasp 
of the ideas and thought of philosophical hermeneutics, we have to know what it is 
opposed to. Originally, hermeneutics was a discipline of the interpretation of sacred, 
legal or literary texts in the mid-17th century.9 Philosophical hermeneutics refers to the 
reflection upon understanding as such. The more general character of this project stems 
from a resistance against the hegemony of the natural sciences, whose compelling rise 
in the 18th and 19th century led to the predominance in all branches of knowledge of what 
was considered to be the scientific method par excellence: the study of phenomena from 
an external point of view in order to discover the laws that explain the movements and 
changes of nature and the vicissitudes of man and society. But according to Friedrich 
Schleiermacher (1768-1834) and Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), the founding fathers of 
philosophical hermeneutics, phenomena such as religion, law and literature have to be 
studied differently. These phenomena are of a different kind – not natural phenomena, 
but manifestations of the human spirit. The purpose of the study of these phenomena is 
not explanation, but understanding. To understand a work of art, for instance, one is not 
confined to a causal explanation of its genesis by disclosing the material conditions that 
constitute it, nor to detached observation of the response or behaviour that it excites. 
This approach would then miss an entire dimension: the aspect of its value or meaning. 
Understanding a work of art means that we take into consideration the imprint it leaves 
on the affects of people. It requires that we ask how the work affects the inner life of those 
involved. But in so doing, we are no longer a detached observer whose observations 
are confined to regularities and causal relations. Understanding a work of art requires 
that we have to conceive of it in terms of the experiences of the inner life – hope, 
anger, remorse – a task that can only be properly performed if we bring along our own 
experiences of hope, anger and remorse. Only when we have experienced those affects 
ourselves are we able to understand the affects operative in others in their reception of 
works of art and other expressions of the human spirit.
 According to Schleiermacher and Dilthey, the methodology of the humanities 
therefore differs fundamentally from those of the natural sciences. As the purpose of the 
humanities is ‘understanding’, its methodology is based not upon a categorical partition 
between object and subject, between the thing studied and the detached scientist, but 
7 See Bix, above n. 4, at 167-168. Hart uses the term ‘hermeneutics’ in later descriptions of his earlier 
work: H.L.A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (1983) at 14, 15.
8 J.J.H. Bruggink, Wat zegt Scholten over recht. Een rechtsfilosofische studie rond het “Algemeen Deel” 
(1983).
9 J. Starobinsky, ‘Foreword’ in F. Schleiermacher, Herméneutique, French transl. by M. Simon (1987) at 
6.
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upon the involvement of the scholar, who is not a neutral observer, but whose experience 
of life is inextricably linked up with the act of understanding. Understanding, then, 
requires an internal point of view, the point of view of the participant.
 This, in barest outline, is the main thesis of philosophical hermeneutics, and this 
thesis has spawned a whole literature on the distinctive features and problems of the 
methodology of the humanities. Philosophical hermeneutics bears the stamp of all 
genuine philosophy: its debates are thorough and profound as well as scholarly and 
esoteric. In this article, I will address only some of its main issues, as far as it has fuelled 
the debates on legal methodology. But before doing so, I still have to vindicate the claim 
that the hermeneutic paradigm is predominant in current legal theory.
4 
To state that hermeneutics provide the model for legal theory is, in fact, making two 
claims. For legal theory is practiced on two levels. It is, on the one hand, the study of a 
particular legal regime so as to determine as precisely as possible what is prescribed or 
prohibited by the law on a certain topic. Legal theory here denotes the academic variety 
of legal adjudication or what is called legal doctrine. But legal theory, on the other hand, 
also denotes the study of law on a more abstract level. On this level, its concern is not the 
content of the law of a specific country or field, but the study of the features and function 
of law as a social institution, as distinguished from other institutions such as religion or 
morals. This is the province of legal sociology, anthropology and philosophy. My claim, 
then, is that on both levels of legal theory the hermeneutic viewpoint is prevalent.
 This claim is best substantiated by the hermeneutic turn in legal theory in its more 
abstract manifestation. Paradoxically, it is the legal positivist H.L.A. Hart who has 
contributed considerably to this approach through his critique on legal positivism of 
the late 19th and early 20th century. In the wake of the natural sciences, legal positivism 
advocated that legal theory should be confined to a descriptive-explanatory theory 
of law, as distinguished from theories or opinions about what law ought to be.10 Its 
propositions should be based upon observations that could be stated in empirical terms, 
in order to be susceptible to confirmation and repudiation by other observers of the 
practice.
 But the reduction of legal phenomena, such as rules and obligations, to observable 
facts only comes at a price. The reduction results in a description of the legal institution 
that accounts for the power the law exerts over its justiciables only in terms of ‘prediction’ 
and ‘behaviour’. Alf Ross, for example, one of the leading Scandinavian Legal Realists, 
reduces the notion of legal validity to two empirically verifiable facts: to say that a rule 
is a valid rule is in fact to say (1) that courts will under specific conditions apply this 
rule or regard it as especially important in reaching their decision, and (2) that the courts 
do so, because they have a certain feeling that accompanies their use of this rule, i.e. an 
emotional experience of ‘being bound’ by the rules.11
 In a review of Ross’s book On Law and Justice,12 Hart remarks that, although 
Ross’s distinction between an internal as well as an external aspect of social rules is 
an important one, Ross draws the line between these aspects in the wrong places.13 If 
a social group really has rules and not merely a set of convergent habits, these rules 
functions as standards for conduct. When, for instance, the judge uses the expression 
that a rule is ‘legally valid’, she is not predicting her own behaviour, nor describing her 
feelings of compulsion. It is used in a normative way, that is, as an internal statement 
in the sense that it manifests her acceptance of the standard.14 ‘Acceptance’ is, among 
other things, a state of mind, a disposition, which cannot be empirically observed. The 
same holds for the claims and justifications based upon the acceptance of a standard. 
These are expressed by a distinctive normative vocabulary such as ‘ought’, ‘should’, 
10 Bix, above n. 4, at 168.
11 For Hart’s outline of Ross’s position, see Hart (1983), above n. 7, at 165.
12 A. Ross, On Law and Justice, M. Dutton (transl.) (1959).
13 Hart (1983), above n. 7, at 166.
14 Id., at 167.
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‘right’ and ‘wrong’. To have a full grasp of what it means to obey or violate a rule, the 
empirical vocabulary of ‘regularities’ of behaviour following a course of action does 
not account for the cause of those reactions. For the cause of these regularities is not a 
law-like response as in physics (the rule does not state that some response will follow), 
but a normative response that encloses the justification of that response (the rule justifies 
the response). The proper study of law needs, therefore, a vocabulary of the inner world 
of the mind, or, to use Hart’s terms, legal theory must look upon the rules of a legal 
system from an internal point of view as accepted standards of behaviour.15 And as the 
recognition of regular behaviour in terms of accepted standards requires an appeal to the 
scholar’s own normative experiences, the viewpoint of the legal scholar might properly 
be characterised as a hermeneutical viewpoint.
 Although Hart’s distinction has been subjected to numerous comments, amendments 
and critiques ever since the publication of The Concept of Law, his claim that legal 
theory has to understand legal practice in a way that takes into account the way the 
practice is perceived by, at least, the legal actors, is generally accepted.16 In this respect, 
one might claim that the hermeneutic viewpoint is the paradigm for legal theory.
 The same holds for legal theory on a more concrete level: legal doctrine. To 
determine the meaning of a statute or ruling requires that one considers its point or 
value. This can only be fully addressed from the perspective of the members of society, 
that is, as someone who considers this particular statute or ruling as a claim that has 
a normative appeal to her. The perspective of the legal scholar is the perspective of 
the participants in the legal practice. The majority conceives of the rules of the legal 
system not primarily as regularities of behaviour or orders backed by threats. They 
rather regard the law as a normative order that offers justificatory reasons to act as it 
prescribes and to impose sanctions in case of violation.17 In this respect, the perspective 
of the legal scholar is similar to that of the judge. Both judge and legal scholar consider 
the law as the authoritative source of rights and duties, as a normative order that binds 
its members. Scholar and judge primarily differ in the degree they feel free to disregard 
or criticise particular elements of the legal order. The judge, after all, is constrained by 
the peculiarities of her office – she is part of a body that is subordinate to the legislator 
or, in common law systems, bound to prior decision (stare decisis), and an official whose 
decisions directly affect citizens and businesses – whereas the scholar is free to criticise 
a regulation or ruling that is deemed to be incompatible with the basic principles of the 
system. But in order to make sense as a statement about current law, the critique has to 
be based on the acceptance of the law as authoritative and has to be framed in terms of 
the system.
 This is the position of the American legal philosopher, Ronald Dworkin, one of 
the most influential theorists of the late 20th century on the topic of legal adjudication. 
According to Dworkin, each interpretation of the law entails a critical examination of 
its normative point or value in light of the values of the system. The proper stance 
of the judge is not neutrality and objectivity (the alleged error of legal positivism), 
but integrity: the disposition of someone whose personal opinions about justice, albeit 
bridled by the system, are a necessary condition for a true understanding of the law.18 
Interpreting the law, therefore, demands a normative standpoint, a standpoint that entails 
an internal – participant’s – point of view.19
 Although Dworkin has eloquently elaborated some of the philosophical and esoteric 
aspects of the methodology of legal adjudication, he is certainly not the first to reject 
objectivism or formalism as a virtue of legal adjudication. The names of a former 
generation of influential legal theorists, such as François Gény (France), Benjamin 
Cardozo and Lon Fuller (United States), Helmut Coing and Joseph Esser (Germany) 
and, for the Netherlands, Paul Scholten, are associated with a conception of legal 
adjudication that emphasises the elements of evaluation and judgment.20 As evaluation 
15 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961, rev. ed. (with postscript) 1994), at 87-91.
16 See, among others, Lenoble, above n. 4; Bix, above n. 4.
17 Hart (1994), above n. 15, at 90.
18 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986) esp. chapters 6 and 7.
19 Id., at 14.
20 F. Gény, Méthode d’interprétation et sources en droit privé positif: essai critique (1919, 2nd ed.); 
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and judgment are normative in character, legal adjudication and legal doctrine, which 
is only the scholarly variety of legal adjudication, presuppose an internal point of view. 
In this respect, one might with some exaggeration say that philosophical hermeneutics 
merely exposes the epistemological assumptions that buttress the opinions about the 
nature of legal adjudication that have been generally accepted by lawyers and legal 
theorists.
5 
Although hermeneutics had originally been developed so as to cut off the hegemony of 
the alleged ‘scientific’ methodology of the natural sciences and to develop an alternative 
for the humanities, philosophical hermeneutics ultimately challenged the ontological 
assumptions of the scientific project as such. The stumbling block for philosophical 
hermeneutics is the distinction between subject and object. This distinction is 
prerequisite to the idea that the purpose of science is to give a true explanation of the 
world, that is, to develop theories about the world as it is. However, the problem is how 
to get access to the world ‘as it is’, since the dominant theory on perception both in 
the sciences and the humanities holds that all perception is theory-laden, subjective or 
established by cultural preconceptions. This epistemological claim, strongly argued for 
by philosophical hermeneutics, has nevertheless experienced strong inhibitions for its 
alleged consequence of relativism – an extremely inconvenient position for scientists 
and lawyers, as I will discuss in section 6. The threat of relativism might explain the 
persistence of the issue of the subject-object partition in legal theory, and the different 
ways it has been interpreted. The debate between Ronald Dworkin and Stanley Fish 
on freedom and constraint in legal adjudication offers an illuminating example of 
the different explanations of the constitutive role of the subject in literary and legal 
interpretation that spark off from the hermeneutic paradigm.
 Dworkin’s theory on legal adjudication is best explained by his resistance against 
judicial discretion as it appears in Hart’s positivist theory of law. According to Hart, 
a legal system consists of rules, the application of which requires a choice in what is 
called a ‘hard case’, as opposed to the plain case, where there is general agreement in 
judgments as to the applicability of the classifying terms of the rule concerned. In hard 
cases, says Hart, the judge has discretion, so that if he applies the rule, the conclusion, 
even though it may not be arbitrary or irrational, is in effect a choice.21
 This rule-producing function that the courts allegedly exhibit at the margin of rules, 
is vehemently contested by Dworkin. He challenges Hart’s analysis of the law as a 
system of (primary and secondary) rules only. Dworkin asserts that the law also consists 
of principles that are not necessarily stated or promulgated, but are implicit in the law. 
The principles are the normative background of the legal system, offering a justification 
for the rights and duties that are inferred from the existing body of rules. In this respect, 
principles direct the interpretation, for the meaning attributed to a rule has to be in 
accordance with the underlying principles. As a result, the decision in hard cases is not 
the judge’s free choice, but something that is, in an elusive way, already implicit in the 
body of law. The right decision, then, is the answer on that legal issue that has to be 
discovered. The upshot of Dworkin’s analysis is his famous, but much contested ‘one 
right answer thesis’, denying that the judge has strong discretion in hard cases.22
 This thesis has been interpreted as a regulative ideal of all interpretation, an 
ontological claim, a methodological assumption, an anti-sceptical stance, a normative 
B.N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921); Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (1964); 
H. Coing, Die juristischen Auslegungsmethoden und die Lehre der allgemeinen Hermeneutik (1959); 
J. Esser, Vorverständnis und Methodenwahl in der Rechtsfindung. Rationalitätsgrundlagen richterlicher 
Entscheidungspraxis (1970); P. Scholten, Mr. C. Asser’s handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands 
burgerlijk recht. Algemeen Deel (1931).
21 Hart (1994), , above n. 15, at 127.
22 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977) ch. 13. 
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prerequisite of legal interpretation and many other things.23 It is outside the scope of 
this article to analyse these responses in more detail. Instead, I would like to focus 
on one plausible reading of Dworkin’s account of legal interpretation, according to 
which Dworkin defends a subject-object partition so as to avoid the pending danger of 
relativism that seems to stick to the hermeneutical stance.
 Dworkin’s article, ‘Law as Literature’,24 and the response by Fish, ‘Working on the 
Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature’,25 are the fruits of their debate on this 
topic during several conferences.26 Dworkin’s thesis is that, although legal interpretation 
is an ultimately normative process, judges are nevertheless constrained by the hard data 
of the law, such as statutory law and precedents. These hard data are given, for it is a 
judge’s duty, as Dworkin states, ‘to interpret the legal history he finds, not to invent a 
better history’.27 What he ‘finds’ are the hard data of the law; and the interpretation of 
it has to determine ‘what the earlier decisions come to, what the point or theme of the 
practice so far, really is’.28 This is the dimension of ‘fit’ that all genuine interpretation 
has to display. The normative aspect of legal interpretation consists in the dimension 
of justification of the legal practice as it is found: it has to show the point or value of 
that body of law in political terms by demonstrating the best principle or policy it can 
be taken to serve.29 Although the dimension of justification brings into the processes of 
interpretation a subjective element, Dworkin assures us that, thanks to the constraints of 
the hard data of the law – the text – legal adjudication will not deteriorate into inventing 
better law according to the personal politics of the judge.
 Dworkin’s account of legal interpretation obviously fits in with the hermeneutic 
viewpoint as far as it concerns the researcher’s or judge’s perspective: for genuine 
interpretation demands that one looks upon the law from an internal perspective, from 
the perspective of the members of the community, who consider the regulations as 
standards that serve as justification for their behaviour and that of others.30 But his 
account of the dimension of ‘fit’ seems to smuggle in the subject-object partition that 
philosophical hermeneutics had expelled so boldly from the account of understanding.
 The gist of Fish’s critique is that Dworkin locates the constraints on interpretation 
in the wrong place, due to a misunderstanding of the nature of interpretation.31 For the 
real constraints on interpretation are not located in the object; they are social. Texts, 
says Fish, do not manifest themselves as brute facts, but appear to us only in interpreted 
form:
[O]ne doesn’t just find a history; rather one views a body of materials with the assumption that it is organized 
by judicial concerns. It is that assumption which gives a shape to the materials, a shape that can then be 
described as having been ‘found’.32
Whether or not an interpretation sufficiently fits the text, is not determined by the text 
as such, but by the text as it is read. The dimension of ‘fit’, therefore, is not an objective 
standard, determined by the raw data that everybody ‘finds’; rather, it refers to the 
conventions and strategies of a particular ‘interpretive community’ of how a text has to 
be read. These conventions and strategies organise the body of materials in such a way 
that a particular reading appears to have a better fit than others. Different interpretive 
communities will, therefore, assess differently the degree of fit between an interpretation 
and the text, and the dispute cannot be settled with reference to the text, but has to be 
23 For twenty-four varieties of the ‘one right answer thesis’, see K. Rozemond, ‘Vierentwintig varianten 
van de one right answer thesis’ in E.T. Feteris et al. (eds.), Met recht en reden (2000) 65-71.
24 R. Dworkin, ‘Law as Literature’ (1982) 60 Texas L. Review 527-550.
25 S. Fish, ‘Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature’ (1982) 60 Texas L. Review 
551-567.
26 See the introduction to this special issue on legal interpretation, (1982) 60 Texas L. Review i-iv.
27 Dworkin (1982), above n. 24, at 544 (emphasis added).
28 Id., at 543 (emphasis added).
29 Id., at 544.
30 A more inclusive group than in Hart’s theory, as for Dworkin legal interpretation is about the political-
moral justification of the legal system from the perspective of the citizens who are subjected to it: Dworkin 
(1977), above n. 22, esp. ch. 4.
31 Fish, above n. 25, at 562.
32 Id., at 557.
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fought out on the field of the alleged goals, purposes, concerns and procedures of the 
institution – on what Dworkin has coined the dimension of justification. The upshot 
of Fish’s critique is that the dimensions of ‘fit’ and ‘justification’ are not distinct, as 
Dworkin holds, with the former constraining the latter, but are inextricably interwoven. 
And this proposition entails, in fact, another one that buttresses the entire enterprise of 
philosophical hermeneutics: the thesis that, in the act of understanding, a strict partition 
of subject and object is untenable.
6 
On the mundane level of judicial practice, the positions of Fish and Dworkin do not 
differ very much. Both reject the two extremes that divide the field of interpretation 
‘between those who believe that interpretation is grounded in objectivity and those who 
believe that interpreters are, for all intents and purposes, free’.33 They both admit that 
interpreters’ normative opinions, whether or not these may be labelled as ideology, are 
a constitutive element of interpretation, although the interpreter or judge is not free to 
invoke any set of opinions. In this respect, one might expect that their account carries the 
general assent of legal practitioners and judges. They feel forced to employ a standard 
set of methods or ‘legal grammar’ that constrains the interpretation and application of 
the law, although it does not wholly determine the decision.34 They share, in short, the 
same paradigm for legal adjudication.35
 The difference between Dworkin and Fish is primarily theoretical. It is concerned 
with the explanation of the nature of the constraints. Dworkin’s position is not fully 
consistent, for he admits that what counts as ‘the text’ rests upon a subtheory about the 
identity of a work, and that subtheory, he continues, will also be controversial.36 But 
if the identity of the text actually depends on opinions, conventions or theories, our 
interpretation is, strictly speaking, not constrained by the text itself, but by our opinions 
or assumptions on how to identify the text, as Fish rightly points out.
 We can only guess what prevented Dworkin from drawing the inevitable conclusion 
that even the text cannot serve as an external constraint on interpretation. In my opinion, 
it is connected with the idea that a constraint we ourselves have called into being, is not 
a constraint at all – with the idea that if interpretation is not constrained by something 
‘given’, but by contingent practices that we ourselves constitute, all interpretation 
is, ultimately, arbitrary. Under the surface of the analysis of ‘understanding’ by 
philosophical hermeneutics, the spectre of relativism looms. For many, relativism 
is itself an objectionable position, and it has been contested for a range of reasons.37 
Lawyers have at least one specific reason to object to relativism. In our legal institution, 
judges are subordinate to the law: they have to administer justice according to the law. 
The presupposition is that the law has a meaning, and that it is possible, at least in 
theory, to determine this meaning. However, if we hold epistemological relativism to 
be true, it would not be the law that determines the decision, but the caste of judges or 
interpreters that asserts the meaning of the law. Relativism would therefore subvert the 
law’s authority. The threat of relativism might explain why Dworkin holds on to the idea 
that the text, even though it rests upon a contested subtheory about identity, nevertheless 
functions as the frozen limit of all interpretation, as the objective criterion to distinguish 
between genuine interpretation and mere ‘invention’. To put it in a phrase Dworkin 
33 Id., at 551.
34 The term ‘legal grammar’ is used by Koskenniemi, above n. 2, at 568, signifying a limited number of 
rules that constitute the system of the production of good legal arguments.
35 Cf. one of the descriptions of a paradigm by Kuhn, as ‘a standard set of methods or of phenomena that 
every … researcher felt forced to employ and explain’. Kuhn, above n. 6, at 12.
36 Id., at 531.
37 For some of those reasons, see, among many, Larry Laudan, Beyond Positivism and Relativism (1996); 
Paul Boghossian, Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism (2006).
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would never use for the obvious fallacy it contains, although it can be extracted from 
his work: the text is an external constraint, because interpretation must be externally 
constrained.38
7 
At best, philosophy is a rigorous discipline, a stringent mode of reasoning, that reveals 
that we sometimes jump to conclusions that are insufficiently warranted or incompatible 
with more basic assumptions. It might reveal that a favourite idea rests upon poor 
grounds, so that we have to reconsider the validity of our beliefs or the grounds on 
which we hold these ideas to be true. In this respect, philosophy might confront us with 
inconvenient truths. But an inconvenient truth is still a truth. If our basic assumptions 
about interpretation – especially the repudiation of a strict partition between object and 
subject – lead us to the conclusion that interpretation depends upon contingent factors, 
the inconvenience of this conclusion does not transmute the reasoning into a sophism. 
In this respect, Fish’s critique that Dworkin’s account of interpretation is inconsistent or 
half-hearted is warranted. If all interpretation is directed towards the determination of 
the meaning, sense or point of a text for us – a standpoint that Dworkin advocates – we 
then are, in a complex way, always part of the text – a standpoint that Dworkin rejects. 
Dworkin’s fear that the lack of an external constraint results in an unsettling interpretive 
freedom, says Fish, is misplaced, and displays his poor understanding of the nature of 
interpretation. Interpretation is not an enterprise in need of constraints, but a structure of 
constraints. It is the institution, not the thing interpreted, which constrains.
 Though theoretically impeccable, Fish’s response is unsatisfactory in one respect. 
A novel is certainly enriched by multiple readings that offer different perspectives on 
that work. Even when these readings are incompatible or hostile to one another, they 
often coexist, in that different ‘interpretive communities’ simultaneously read, reflect 
and respond on that work of art. Especially in the humanities, different schools or 
paradigms vie with one another, enriching the soil of our understanding of cultural and 
social life. But law is a different phenomenon. It is, on the one hand, a phenomenon that 
can be studied from different disciplines and perspectives. Both our understanding and 
the development of the institution will, in the long run, benefit from the various voices 
that comment on it. On the other hand, law is also a social institution that regulates 
social life. As it interferes deeply in the life of the members of the community, the 
key values of the legal system are, among other things, legal certainty, uniformity, and 
predictability. These values are the prerequisites for the functioning of a stable legal 
system. They are a kind of internal morality of the law that allows the members of the 
community to adjust their acts and mutual expectations to the directives of the law.39 
Even if we agree that all interpretation is always constrained by some standards that 
hold for some interpretive community, as Fish states, the principal question for legal 
practitioners is which standards, out of many, ought to govern the interpretation and 
application of the law of their community. The legal community needs a standard set 
of methods that its competent members feel forced to employ, that is, a paradigm for 
the legal profession. Dworkin might have located these constraints in the wrong place, 
but he rightly considered the legal enterprise as an enterprise in need of constraints, 
which cannot be substituted for different ones due to a judge’s ideological or scientific 
preferences. And if we credit the hermeneutic viewpoint, the judge must not only 
feel forced to use these standards, but she has to accept them as the appropriate set of 
standards as well.
38 See Dworkin (1982), above n. 24, at 543 (emphasis in original): ‘He must interpret what has gone 
before because he has a responsibility to advance the enterprise in hand rather than strike out in some new 
direction of his own.’ 
39 See L.L. Fuller, The Internal Morality of Law (1963, rev. ed. 1969).
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Philosophy exhibits a paradox. It tries to understand man, society and the world 
rationally. The fruit of this endeavour is an innumerable amount of philosophical 
accounts, which are each subject to critical philosophical examination. Judged by 
the rigorous standards of rationality, all philosophical explanation turns out to be 
inadequate in some respects, for neither its premises nor its criterion of truth can be 
fully accounted for, that is, rationally justified. The sceptics, evaluating the validity of 
the rational accounts and explanations of other philosophers and theorists, reproach 
them with holding a naive faith in reason or, what in fact boils down to the same thing, 
for not being rational enough. Seen from this perspective, the debate between Dworkin 
and Fish might be comprehended as the continuation of the fight between some variety 
of rationalism and scepticism from within the hermeneutic paradigm. Dworkin’s ‘right 
answer’ thesis is a defence of legal interpretation as a methodologically constrained 
activity to such a degree that the decision, even in hard cases, can be rationally justified. 
The sceptic Fish rebuts this conclusion, for the decisions of judges are rational only to 
the degree that they share a set of interpretive standards – standards that make up the 
dimensions of fit and justification. To the extent that all theory and all judgment are 
inextricably intertwined with the mundane banalities of everyday life, our acceptance of 
a philosophical posture or judicial decision is not rational at all, but, on a fundamental 
level, illogical or groundless.
 Despite their controversy, rationalism and scepticism share a language or grammar, 
which positions them not as two different worldviews but as two extremes in the same 
enterprise: the search for rational truth. In my opinion, the sceptics are the more strict 
rationalists, who draw out the utmost consequence of their analysis: that the mission 
for truth is doomed to fail, because the criterion of rationality is itself not neutral 
and objective. Relativism, so conceived, is not the opposite of rationalism, but its 
extreme consequence. However, the rightness of the relativistic position holds under 
the assumption that, in order to be true, a proposition must be rationally attested, an 
assumption that itself cannot be rationally warranted.
 The controversy between rationalism and scepticism seems unsolvable. Rationalism 
incessantly runs up against the limits of reason, whereas scepticism’s predicament is that 
it repudiates rationalism on the basis of a rational critique that presupposes, but cannot 
prove, its validity. It seems that the only way out is challenging the shared concept of 
truth as rational truth, that is, the idea that a proposition is true if, and only if, its validity 
can be warranted on rational grounds. In fact, the hermeneutic viewpoint points towards 
a different approach, although it is speech act theory that is most promising in this 
respect.
 The import of speech act theory for legal theory is that it meets the need for a common 
ground that secures the reasonableness of legal interpretation, while simultaneously 
acknowledging that reason itself cannot fully account for it. However, the merits of 
speech act theory for law are not only philosophical. It also suggests a legal methodology 
for the study of law, one that exposes the deep structure or ‘grammar’ of argumentative 
schemes in legal debate and controversy.
 In order to fully grasp how the challenge of relativism is countered by speech 
act theory and, albeit half-heartedly, by hermeneutics, I will first discuss how both 
approaches deal with the issue of truth and arbitrariness in meaning and interpretation. 
I will particularly address the works of two philosophers, namely Truth and Method 
by H.-G. Gadamer and Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigation and On Certainty, 
which so deeply influenced speech act theory. In section 10 and further, I will discuss 
the implications of their approach for legal theory.
9 
The decisive shift in philosophical hermeneutics is made by Gadamer, in the wake of 
Heidegger’s phenomenological description of the fore-structure of understanding. ‘A 
person,’ says Gadamer, ‘who is trying to understand is exposed to distraction from 
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fore-meanings that are not borne out by the things themselves.’40 The constant task 
of hermeneutics is ‘working out appropriate projections, anticipatory in nature, to be 
confirmed “by the things” themselves.’41 But the true object of understanding is not 
the ‘thing itself’, but the unity of ‘understanding one’s own historicity’ and the thing 
that is the object of understanding.42 The real task in understanding is to examine 
explicitly the legitimacy – i.e. the origin and validity – of the fore-meanings dwelling 
with the interpreter, for ‘understanding realizes its full potential only when the fore-
meanings that it begins with are not arbitrary.’43 True understanding is the interplay 
of the movement of tradition and the movement of the interpreter: ‘The anticipation 
of meaning that governs our understanding of a text is not an act of subjectivity, but 
proceeds from the commonality that binds us to the tradition.’44
 Although the wording is somewhat ethereal, the main theses of philosophical 
hermeneutics, as we discussed earlier, are present here. First, the text is not given, but 
is given shape in the act of understanding (the unity between object and one’s own 
historicity). Second, understanding always involves the prejudices of the interpreter 
– the fore-meanings or fore-structure of understanding. Third, understanding is not 
arbitrary, for the prejudices have to be secured, as Heidegger says, by working out 
the fore-structures in terms of the things themselves.45 Fourth, ‘correct’ prejudices are 
secured by the tradition we belong to (the history the judge ‘finds’, as Dworkin puts it). 
Although tradition is not simply a permanent precondition – it is produced by ourselves 
inasmuch as we participate in the evolution of tradition46 – neither it is a mere subjective 
experience of historical events. As Gadamer succinctly states: ‘[H]istory does not belong 
to us; we belong to it.’47
 For philosophical hermeneutics, the role of tradition is vital for true understanding. 
Although we are always situated within traditions, we have to be addressed by tradition. 
We should not approach a text directly, relying solely on the prejudices already available 
to us, but rather explicitly examine the legitimacy of the fore-meaning dwelling within 
us.48 The problem for true understanding is not that understanding is grounded in 
prejudice or fore-structure, but that our prejudices might be arbitrary for being poorly 
connected with tradition. Tradition, for Gadamer, is the whole of texts, institutions and 
persons, whose authority is recognised in an act of acknowledgement and knowledge 
– the knowledge that the other is superior to oneself in judgment and insight and that 
for that reason his judgment takes precedence.49 The recognition of authority doesn’t 
mean that tradition is accepted in blind obedience, but that it is considered, affirmed, 
embraced and cultivated.50 It is not something given, not a brute fact,51 but something 
that is, as it were, produced by innumerable acts of the participants in the practice. 
Tradition, in short, is an institution. And the correctness of an interpretation is connected 
with the institution as it rises up out of the practices that constitute it.
 The term ‘institution’ refers to another important philosophical tradition of the 20th 
century: speech act theory. Although the philosophical roots of hermeneutics and speech 
act theory are worlds apart, they share an important insight. They both discard the idea 
of the faculty of reason as an independent and autonomous source of knowledge. Both 
hold that our thoughts and ideas are not the fruits of the individual mind, the meaning of 
which could only be known by the person who experiences, or produces, them. Rather, 
they are intimately connected to the way the words and concepts, which are applied to 
40 H.-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, transl. by J. Weinsheimer and D.G. Marshall of Wahrheit und 
Methode (1975, rev. ed. 1989) at 267.
41 Id., at 267.
42 Id., at 299.
43 Id., at 267.
44 Id., at 293.
45 M. Heidegger, Being and Time, transl. by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson of Sein und Zeit (1962) at 153.
46 Gadamer, above n. 40, at 293.
47 Id., at 267.
48 Id., at 276.
49 Id., at 279.
50 Id., at 281.
51 For the term ‘brute fact’, see J.R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (1995) ch. 1.
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express those mental experiences, are used in the community of which she is part. Ideas 
and thoughts, therefore, belong as much to the social world as they are individual; they 
are a mental activity as well as a way of acting.
 Speech act theory, firmly rooted in the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein and John. L. 
Austin,52 has developed a sociological view on knowledge. According to this view, 
every statement about nature and man is embedded in a network of statements, which 
together form an institution. The institution of a natural language might be illuminating 
in this respect. To speak a language is to participate in an institution. Each language user 
is subject to the standards of correct language use, but the standards are dependent on 
their use by the community of language users. As such, language is a social construction 
that derives its existence from being performed. In this respect, there is no true essence 
of English, Dutch or Papiamento, except for the way it is spoken. One might conclude 
that, as a language is ‘just’ a social construction, and therefore contingent in its shape, 
it cannot be normative – for there is no absolutely wrong or correct way to speak that 
particular language. But this is not the way we deal with language. Children learn a 
language by following examples, and they are corrected when they commit an error 
– that is, when they deviate from the rule. The rigorous training in correct speaking 
and writing explains the perception of one’s mother language as a rather fixed and 
immutable phenomenon to such a degree that purists resist the influx of loan words 
and expressions, barbarisms that are at variance with what they consider to be the true 
essence of their language.
 What holds for the institution of natural languages, holds for all institutions. The 
philosophical claim of speech act theory is that all knowledge is based upon institutions. 
The intellectual superstructure of our knowledge, including those parts that seem purely 
mental, such as arithmetic, is built upon a way of acting. In Philosophical Investigations 
and On Certainty, Wittgenstein meticulously analyses what justifies the solution of 
simple arithmetic problems, or our acceptance of a proposition, the truth of which is 
beyond reasonable doubt. For these propositions, he states, a rational proof cannot be 
given, because each reason is itself in need of justification. In the end, we just accept the 
proposition, not on rational grounds, but because it is the way we do things. The solution 
of a complex arithmetic problem, for example, might be justified with reference to a 
standard set of rules or standards that determines the solution. But the presupposition 
is that we apply those rules correctly – that we know how to handle them – and this 
kind of knowledge is firmly based upon practices that have been learned through 
endless processes of copying, repetition and rectification.53 Here, at the foundation of 
our knowledge, the tight connection between knowledge and action becomes manifest: 
finally, we can justify the way we count and subtract – following some rule – only by 
reference to the way we act, as Wittgenstein states in a much cited paragraph:
‘How am I able to obey a rule?’ – if this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justification for 
my following the rule in the way I do.
 If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined 
to say: ‘This is simply what I do.’54
The same holds for propositions that we take to be certain. Take the ‘truisms’ that G.E. 
Moore mentioned in his ‘Proof of an External World’, e.g. that he knew that there was 
one hand in the place indicated by combining a certain gesture with his first utterance of 
‘here’ and that there was another in the different place indicated by combining a certain 
52 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen/Philosophical Investigations, G.E.M. Anscombe and 
R. Rhees (eds.), G.E.M. Anscombe (transl.) (1953); J.L. Austin, How to do Things with Words (1962, rev. 
ed. 1975).
53 See L. Wittgenstein, Über Gewissheit/On Certainty, G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright (eds.), 
D. Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe (transl.) (1969) § 44: ‘If you demand a rule from which it follows that there 
can’t have been a miscalculation here, the answer is that we did not learn this through a rule, but by learning 
to calculate.’ Also § 212: ‘In certain circumstances, for example, we regard a calculation as sufficiently 
checked. What gives us a right to do so? Experience? May that not have deceived us? Somewhere we must 
be finished with justification, and then there remains the proposition that this is how we calculate.’
54 Wittgenstein (1953), above n. 52, at § 217.
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gesture with his second utterance of ‘here’.55 Wittgenstein objects to Moore’s account, 
for his truisms are not subject to ‘knowledge’ in the same way as statements that are less 
obviously certain, like propositions about the precise distance between earth and sun:
The propositions presenting what Moore ‘knows’ are all of such a kind that it is difficult to imagine why 
anyone should believe the contrary. E.g. the proposition that Moore has spent his whole life in close 
proximity to the earth. – Once more I can speak of myself instead of speaking of Moore. What would 
induce me to believe the opposite? Either a memory, or having been told. – Everything that I have seen or 
heard gives me the conviction that no man has ever been far from the earth. Nothing in my picture of the 
world speaks in favour of the opposite.56
The same holds for the truism that the earth existed for many years past. This is not 
something we assume, as if we could also reasonably assume the opposite. We do not 
know it, in the sense of knowing it to be true, but it stands fast for us; and to regard it as 
absolutely solid is part of our method of doubt and inquiry:57
[I]n the entire system of our language-games it belongs to the foundation. The assumptions, one might say, 
forms the basis of action, and therefore, of thought.58
It is in this sense that Moore’s truisms, although we cannot prove them to be true, are not 
arbitrary. Their role is like that of the rules of a game. They have a peculiar logical role 
in the system of our empirical propositions, for it is against the inherited background of 
those truisms or convictions that we distinguish between true and false:59
All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system. And 
this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all our arguments: no, it 
belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of departure, as 
the element in which arguments have their life.60
Much more could be said about the role of these truisms or self-evident truths in our 
thinking, but, for the sake of my argument, the most important aspect is that these 
truisms are not learned through rules: we are taught judgments and their connection 
with other judgments; and it is this totality of judgments that is made plausible for us.61 
That is the way a child learns to believe many things. It learns to act according to these 
beliefs and bit by bit there forms a system of what is believed. ‘What stands fast,’ says 
Wittgenstein, ‘does so, not because it is intrinsically obvious or convincing; it is rather 
held fast by what lies around it.’62 The truth of these truisms is not rational truth, for it 
is the background of beliefs against which we distinguish between true and false. At the 
foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded, but inherited:63
If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, nor yet false.64
The similarity between the role of tradition in the account of philosophical hermeneutics 
and the role of truisms in Wittgenstein’s account is obvious. They both serve as the 
foundation of our judgments and knowledge, a foundation that cannot be rationally 
justified. Nevertheless, they significantly differ in one respect. Gadamer emphasises 
the aspect of reason in the acknowledgement of the authority of tradition, whereas 
Wittgenstein considers the truisms to be beyond true and false. Authority, says Gadamer, 
must be earned. It rests on acknowledgment and hence on an act of reason itself. 
Authority in this sense has nothing to do with blind obedience to commands, but rather 
with knowledge.65 But one might ask, with Wittgenstein, what kind of knowledge it is 
55 G.E. Moore, ‘Proof of an External World’, Proceedings of the British Academy 25 (1939) 273-300.
56 Wittgenstein (1969), above n. 53, at § 93. The example is outdated, for nowadays at least some men and 
women have left the earth’s atmosphere.
57 Id., at § 151.
58 Id., at § 411. See also § 204: ‘Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; – but 
the end is not certain propositions’ striking us immediately true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it 
is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game.’
59 Id., at § 94.
60 Id., at § 105.
61 Id., at § 140.
62 Id., at § 144.
63 Id., at § 253.
64 Id., at § 205.
65 Gadamer, above n. 40, at 279.
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that induces someone to accept one tradition rather than another – for we already belong 
to tradition. And part of the reasons for accepting one version or reading of tradition is 
grounded on judgments – judgments that themselves cannot be deliberately accepted, 
because they are constitutive of acceptance and rejection.
 It seems that even Gadamer shies away from drawing the conclusion, implicit in his 
account of understanding, that reason is not at the base of knowledge, but groundless 
beliefs. By emphasising the aspect of reason in handling our prejudices,66 he still 
contrasts irrationality and arbitrariness with reason. Wittgenstein’s account seems more 
accurate to me: it is on the basis of unfounded beliefs that we can judge propositions to 
be irrational, arbitrary, false or true. What gives them their credit, is the way we act. Not 
theory, but practices are at the bottom of knowledge.
10 
The crucial step by Wittgenstein in his reflection on truth is that he connects knowledge, 
and therefore meaning and interpretation, with practices. Our thinking is tributary to the 
way we act, both as a matter of how we actually learn as well as epistemologically. That 
made him subject to the reproach of relativism. For if truth is a function of groundless 
beliefs, does this not, in fact, get rid of the notion of truth as such and exclude a right 
answer in serious disputes, when worldviews clash? That, indeed, is Wittgenstein’s 
position. If a king, asks Wittgenstein, has been brought up in the belief that the world 
began with him, could Moore really prove his belief to be the right one, if they were to 
meet and discuss?
I do not say that Moore could not convert the king to his view, but it would be a conversion of a special kind; 
the king would be brought to look at the world in a different way.67
He would, for example, be induced to go over to this point of view because of its 
simplicity or symmetry. At the end of reasons, adds Wittgenstein, comes persuasion.68
This account excludes right answers and absolute truths in the case of incompatible 
worldviews. But Wittgenstein would dismiss the term ‘relativism’ as a characterisation 
of his position. The predicate ‘true’ or ‘false’ of a proposition makes sense only within 
a system of beliefs – or form of life – that we hold fast. But to call a form of life or 
worldview ‘true’ or ‘false’ is senseless, for we would have to judge the very foundation 
of our judgments – as if we have to determine the ‘true’ value of a currency apart from 
banks, exchange rates, trade and savings balances, institutions that together make up 
the institution of money. We can, of course, say that different worldviews are equally 
worthwhile, but such an assertion reveals, at best, something about our own worldview, 
not about the alleged value of others.
 The connection between knowledge and practices removes the arbitrariness of 
our judgments. Truth is a function of being grounded – and our most firm beliefs are 
grounded, not upon propositions whose truths are, from a rational point of view, self-
evident or manifest, but upon a way of acting from which many truisms may be inferred. 
The existence of an external world, for example, is implicit in the way we act and judge, 
and we are seldom explicitly taught ‘that an external world really exists’. A child does 
not learn that books and armchairs exist, but learns to fetch books and to sit in armchairs 
– it swallows their existence, so to speak, together with what it learns.69 And law students 
learn more thoroughly that rights exist through courses devoted to property, tort and 
procedural law rather than by a philosophical account on the nature of law.70 The same 
holds for the institution of law itself. Its structure and foundation rise from the interplay 
66 By using terms like affirmation, embrace and cultivation, Gadamer points towards the aspects of 
consideration and deliberation, that is, to reason, id., at 281.
67 Wittgenstein (1969), above n. 53, at § 92.
68 Id., at § 612.
69 Id., at § 144.
70 The same idea is expressed by Kuhn, who states that concrete models, that is, paradigms, are prior to 
the various concepts, laws, theories and points of view that may be abstracted from it: Kuhn, above n. 6, at 
11.
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between practices and regulations, or to use an intriguing metaphor by Wittgenstein: the 
foundation-walls are carried by the whole house.71 It is our acting in particular cases, not 
reason, that secures the correctness of our prejudices or fore-understanding.
 Wittgenstein’s account takes the sting out of scepticism – its paralysing relativism, 
which does not lead so much to intellectual modesty, but which undermines the credibility 
of its own account and of the scientific approach as such. But more important perhaps is 
that it offers a direction how to study social phenomena, such as law. It does not reject 
rational accounts or explanations as such. Rather, it reveals that these are fertile only 
if we take seriously the practices through which law, language and other institutions 
manifest themselves, and thoroughly investigate how words and concepts are used in 
different contexts. Such an analysis could reveal the deep structure or ‘grammar’ of 
a practice, which manifests itself through its vocabulary. For it is through language, 
conceived of as speech acts, that a social reality is constructed.72
 Both speech act theory and hermeneutics emphasise that reason manifests itself 
through the spectra of culture. In this respect, culture matters in law. What is reasonable 
or true in law cannot be determined apart from the legal system as an historic (or 
cultural) phenomenon. One might consider this approach as characteristic of post-war 
European legal thought, influenced as it is by a distinctive ‘continental’ (i.e. German) 
theme in philosophy. Continental philosophy is a generic term, including philosophical 
movements such as phenomenology, existentialism, structuralism and psychoanalysis.73 
It refers to a set of traditions of 19th and 20th century philosophy from mainland Europe 
that emphasise the import of factors such as context, space and time, language, culture 
or history, on science and philosophical thought.74 This is particularly manifest in the 
work of Gadamer (a German philosopher), who regards ‘tradition’ as the repository of 
reason. But this ‘continental trait’ is also patent in the work of the later Wittgenstein 
(an Austrian philosopher, albeit strongly associated with British analytical philosophy), 
who treats rationality as an immanent phenomenon, operative on the level of language-
games and forms of life. Their influence on European legal thought has been profound. 
The hermeneutic approach for law has been developed by scholars such as Karl Larenz, 
Josef Esser and Karl Engisch,75 whereas the development of an analytic hermeneutics, 
merging the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein and hermeneutics, has been undertaken 
by, among others, Aulis Aarnio and Ota Weinberger.76 It is through these authors that the 
hermeneutic approach has been generally accepted in legal theory.
 The import of culture for the study of law leads me to a development in the social 
sciences of the past twenty years that appears to be very promising for legal theory: the 
growing interest in metaphor.77 An increasing amount of studies reveal the centrality 
of metaphor in human thought.78 These theories are underpinned by a conception of 
language as developed by speech act theory, and it is this connection that renders the 
study of legal metaphor a most promising field of legal research.
71 Wittgenstein (1969), above n. 53, at § 248.
72 Searle, above n. 51.
73 See B. Leiter, The Oxford Handbook of Continental Philosophy, B. Leiter and M. Rosen (eds.) (2007) 
at 2.
74 S. Critchley, Continental Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction (2001) at 57.
75 K. Larenz, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (1969, rev. ed. 1983); J. Esser, Vorverständnis und 
Methodenwahl in der Rechtsfindung. Rationalitätsgrundlagen richterlicher Entscheidungspraxis (1970); 
K. Engisch, Einführung in das juristische Denken (1964, rev. ed. 1983).
76 A. Aarnio, Linguistic Philosophy and Legal Theory (1987); O. Weinberger, Law, Institution, and Legal 
Politics: Fundamental Problems of Legal Theory and Social Philosophy (1991).
77 I will leave out a second fertile approach, the institutional theory of law, although I have pointed towards 
this approach in the previous sections of this article.
78 M. Black, ‘Metaphor’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 55 (1954) 273-294, reprinted in M. 
Black, Models and Metaphors. Studies in Language and Philosophy (1962) 25-48. For publications on 
metaphor, see, among others, A. Ortony (ed.), Metaphor and Thought (1979); Raymond W. Gibbs, The 
Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought (2008). Both publications include contributions from 
different disciplines such as psychology, anthropology, linguistics, cognitive sciences, philosophy and 
literature.
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Metaphor structures understanding. That is, in short, the essence of a developing body 
of work on human cognition. In a pioneering work, G. Lakoff and M. Johnson examine 
how our thinking is permeated by metaphors, and how they structure the way we 
understand reality.79 They start their book with the concept ‘argument’, and (one of) the 
metaphor(s) that direct(s) it: the metaphor ‘argument is war’. This metaphor is reflected 
in everyday language by a host of expressions: claims are indefensible, every weak point 
in the argument is attacked, someone’s argument is demolished, arguments are shot 
down, etc.80 This, however, is not just a matter of language, of mere words, but a way of 
how we conceptualise argument:
[W]e don’t just talk about arguments in terms of war. We can actually win or lose arguments. We see the 
person we are arguing with as an opponent. We attack his position and defend our own …. Many things we 
do in arguing are partially structured by the concept of war.81
We talk about arguments that way, because we conceive of them that way – and we act 
according to the way we conceive of things.82 Lakoff and Johnson give many examples 
of metaphors that perform a vital role in our conceptual framework. Some of them are 
very basic, like the container schema (to see fear in someone’s eyes, to have a full life, 
to get into trouble), spatial metaphors (for example, the ‘up-down’ metaphors in e.g. 
‘head of state’, ‘a higher status’), and the ‘source-path-goal’ schema (of which the ‘life 
is a journey’ metaphor is part).
 Two aspects of metaphor are especially relevant here. First, a metaphor is a conceptual 
schema or model that organises the body of statements that could intelligibly be stated 
about a topic. If ‘love is a collaborative work of art’ (a metaphor, for it is neither work 
nor art according to the alleged literal meaning of the words), then the elements of 
‘work’ and ‘art’ give rise, among other things, to the following entailments: love requires 
cooperation, dedication, compromise and discipline; and it is an aesthetic experience, 
valued for its own sake, creates a reality, is unique, etc.83 Each statement is intelligible 
in light of the metaphor, and together they form a coherent body of propositions.84 A 
different schema (e.g. ‘love is madness’ or ‘love is war’) would have brought about a 
different complex of related propositions.85 Second, although different metaphors are 
used to describe similar human experiences (e.g. ‘love is war’ and ‘love is madness’, 
among many others), metaphors are not arbitrary. Like the truisms that Wittgenstein 
discusses, most metaphors are grounded in systematic correlations with our physical and 
cultural experiences and the way we deal with them.86 The basic experiences provide 
the organising principles for the construction of conceptual models, like the container 
schema and the source-path-goal schema.87 These are the way reality is experienced and 
perceived, and they are neither true nor false, because they are part of the conceptual 
structure that frames judgment.
 In this respect – and of special interest for legal theorists – legal theory itself is rife 
with metaphors. In an article, called ‘“Penumbra”: The Roots of a Legal Metaphor’, B. 
Henly enumerates a multitude of metaphors, sparked off from the spatial schema, that 
are used to describe the building blocks of law:88
79 G. Lakoff and M. Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (1980).
80 Id., at 4.
81 Id., at 4.
82 Id., at 5.
83 Id., at 139 et seq.
84 Id., esp. ch. 16.
85 Respectively, the statements ‘to be crazy about someone; to be wild about someone’ and the statements 
‘to be known for his conquests; she fought for him, but the other won out’: Lakoff and Johnson, above n. 
79, at 87-97.
86 Id., ch. 13.
87 For references to empirical work on this topic in experimental psychology, linguistics and anthropology, 
see Steven L. Winter, ‘The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance’ (1988) 40 Stan. L. 
Review 1371 at 1384.
88 B. Henly, ‘ “Penumbra”: The Roots of a Legal Metaphor’ (1987) 15 Hastings Const. L.Q. 81.
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[L]egal ideas often seem to have weight as well as volume, as when interests are ‘balanced’. Spatial 
metaphors make it possible to visualize change. Doctrines can be extended, narrowed, expanded, and 
circumscribed. Branches are separated, but not hermetically sealed of. Legal rules develop frontiers, cores, 
and cutting edges. Without splitting hairs, fine lines get drawn.89
These metaphors do not only describe abstract concepts in a way that facilitates 
comprehension, they also affect the way we act as lawyers. The spatial metaphors add 
to the view that the law is something that exists ‘out there’, in the world of objects. 
But if the law is reified, if it is comprehended as a physical object, fixed by spatial 
coordinates, then it could bring about the view that law is an object that can be studied 
in a way that resembles the methods of scientists or, more appropriate here, those of the 
land surveyor, by ‘setting a statute next to the Constitution to see how it measures up’.90 
The use of spatial metaphors to describe law, in short, might explain that lawyers are 
still attracted to the dubious idea that legal adjudication could be performed neutrally, 
as detached as a scientist who measures the distance between the Milky Way and the 
Andromeda Galaxy.
 This example reveals that metaphors have normative effects, even if they were 
initially used to describe a phenomenon or to grasp the similarities between different 
phenomena.91 A prevailing metaphor might explain the deep structure or grammar of the 
arguments that are put forward on a certain topic; and it might also explain why a strand 
of arguments sometimes has been discarded.
 An example of the latter is provided by the evolution of metaphorical inferences as 
applied to the Internet within legal commentary and judicial opinion.92 As Blavin and 
Glenn Cohen point out, much of the early thinking about the Internet is shaped by the 
‘information superhighway’ metaphor. This metaphor connotes a transfer of information. 
The information superhighway is an account of space. The metaphor highlights the 
resemblances with real highways. Just as real highways are used to transport persons 
and objects, the Internet can also be conceived of as a means of transportation, for 
example for messages, like emails. Real highways are regulated by the government, 
so the metaphor furthers the presumption of (federal) government regulation of the 
Internet.93 This metaphor was eclipsed by another, the ‘cyberspace metaphor’. The 
cyberspace metaphor highlights the fluid character of the Internet. Conceived of this 
way, the Internet is not a ‘real’ place, but rather a virtual space, nothing but the flow 
of digital data through the network of interconnected computers.94 Related to this idea 
is the concept of the Internet as a ‘frontier’, ‘as the 19th century American West in 
its natural preference for social devices that emerge from its conditions, rather than 
those that are imposed from the outside.’95 The metaphor of cyberspace as a novel 
place, existing outside any territory, was adopted by the Supreme Court, including the 
normative inference that the Internet was, therefore, potentially immune to real space 
regulation.96 Currently, the ‘internet as real space’ metaphor has become prevalent, on 
the footing that the Internet can be moulded to coincide with real territorial boundaries 
and legal jurisdictions through filtering and geographical pinpointing technologies.97 
This metaphor will also affect and organise the normative choices that can be made, 
although it does not mean that the metaphor determines them.
 As the law is framed in metaphors, legal metaphor can be found in all legal fields, 
from corporate law (the doctrine of corporations as legal persons), to procedural law 
(the doctrine of ‘standing’) and criminal law (the metaphor of ‘terrorism as war’).98 
89 Id., at 82.
90 Id..
91 For the heuristic function of analogy and metaphor, see M. Hesse, ‘Aristotle’s Logic of Analogy (1965) 
15(61) Philosophical Quarterly 328-340.
92 J.H. Blavin and I. Glenn Cohen, ‘Gore, Gibson, and Goldsmith: The Evolution of Internet Metaphors 
in Law and Commentary’ (2002) 16 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 265.
93 Id., at 273.
94 Id., at 276.
95 Id., at 267.
96 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
97 Blavin and Cohen (2002), above n. 92, at 282.
98 Respectively, Sanford A. Schane, ‘The Corporation as Legal Person: The Language of a Legal 
Fiction’ (1987) 61 Tul. L. Rev. 563; Steven L. Winter, ‘The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-
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Metaphors guide the use of fundamental legal concepts, such as sovereignty, will and 
conscience.99 These studies reveal that the use of arguments in law is less arbitrary than 
pragmatists and critical scholars assume,100 if we at least connect the argumentation 
to the metaphors that constitute the particular discourse. The metaphors themselves 
are grounded in experiences or ways of perceiving and are, therefore, not susceptible 
to scientific testing methods to validate their truth-value. But that does not render the 
argumentation into arbitrary conceptual schemes. They mediate, as Mary Hesse states, 
a kind of social knowledge and provide evaluations reflecting social interests and 
judgments of significance.101
 It seems that Heidegger’s fore-understanding, Gadamer’s prejudices that are secured 
by tradition and Wittgenstein’s ‘forms of life’ have taken a more concrete and, so to 
speak, palpable form through these conceptual models or schemes that bring about the 
spatial, temporal and substantial metaphors in which the law is framed. In this respect, 
culture matters in the study of law. Although the very foundation of the conceptual 
framework displays striking resemblances in different cultures – e.g. the metaphors that 
stem from the up-down schema – most metaphors are culturally specific, such as the 
metaphors of battle, sports and sex that are prevalent in American legal discourse on the 
adversary system.102 The study of legal metaphor, therefore, exposes how man, society 
and reality are comprehended. They offer, as it were, the ‘cultural grammar’ of a society 
and deepen our understanding of the argumentative schemes that are operative in legal 
adjudication.
Governance’ (1988) 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1371; Louis Henkin, ‘War and Terrorism: Law or Metaphor’ (2005) 45 
Santa Clara L. Rev. 817; and B. van Eekelen et al. (eds.), Shock and Awe. War on Words (2004). In fact, the 
literature on analogy and precedent could also be added, as the reasoning processes resemble those in the 
use of metaphor. See, among others, Scott Brewer, ‘Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the 
Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy’ (1996) 109 Harv. L. Rev. 923; Dan Hunter, ‘Reason is Too 
Large: Analogy and Precedent in Law’ (2001) 50 Emory L.J. 1197; and Cass R. Sunstein, ‘On Analogical 
Reasoning’ (1993) 106 Harv. L. Rev. 741.
99 For the concepts of sovereignty and will, see C.E. Smith, ‘Soevereiniteit: solipsisme of institutie?’ 
(Sovereignty: solipsism or institution?) in G. Molier and T. Slootweg (eds.), Soevereiniteit en recht. 
Rechtsfilosofische beschouwingen (2009) 33-52; for the concept of conscience, see C.E. Smith, 
‘Fenomenologie van de gewetensbeslissing: twee varianten’ (Phenomenology of the conscientious decision: 
two varieties) in A. Ellian et al. (eds.), Recht, beslissing en geweten (2010) 181-200.
100 For a pragmatic view on legal adjudication, see Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 
(1993); a more radical scepticism is defended by, among others, Duncan Kennedy, ‘Form and Substance in 
Private Law Adjudication’ (1976) 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685.
101 M. Hesse, ‘The Cognitive Claims of Metaphor’ (1988) II(1) The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 1 at 
8, first published in J.P. van Noppen (ed.), Metaphor and Religion (1984) 27-45.
102 See E.G. Thornburg, ‘Metaphors Matter: How Images of Battle, Sports, and Sex Shape the Adversary 
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